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Abstract
We look at non-classical negations and their corresponding adjustment connectives
from a modal viewpoint, over complete distributive lattices, and apply a very general
mechanism in order to offer adequate analytic proof systems to logics that are based
on them. Defining non-classical negations within usual modal semantics automati-
cally allows one to treat equivalent formulas as synonymous, and to have a natural
justification for a global version of the contraposition rule. From that perspective, our
study offers a particularly useful environment in which negative modalities and their
companions may be used for dealing with inconsistency and indeterminacy. After
investigating modal logics based on arbitrary frames, we extend the results to serial
frames, reflexive frames, functional frames, and symmetric frames. In each case we
also investigate when and how classical negation may thereby be defined.
Keywords: negative modalities, sequent systems, cut-admissibility, analyticity.
1 Capturing the impossible, and its dual
Many well-known subclassical logics —including intuitionistic logic and several
many-valued logics— share the conjunction-disjunction fragment of classical
logic, but disagree about the exact notion of opposition and the specific logical
features to be embodied in negation. In contrast, modal logics are often thought
of as superclassical, and are obtained by the addition of identity-like ‘positive
modalities’ 2 and ♦. For various well-known cases, such modalities fail to have
a finite-valued characterization. Notwithstanding, each m-ary connective D of
a modal logic is typically congruential (with respect to the underlying conse-
quence relation ⊢), in treating equivalent formulas as synonymous: if αi ⊢ βi
and βi ⊢ αi, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then D(α1, . . . , αm) ⊢ D(β1, . . . , βm). To
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logical systems containing only such sort of connectives one might associate se-
mantics in terms of neighborhood frames (see ch.5 of [23]), and the same applies
if one uses 1-ary ‘negative modalities’ instead, as in [19]. But normal modal
logics make their 1-ary positive modalities respect indeed a stronger property:
if α ⊢ β then D(α) ⊢ D(β). Such monotone behavior may be captured by se-
mantics based on Kripke frames, and the same applies to the antitone behavior
that characterize negative modalities, namely: if α ⊢ β then D(β) ⊢ D(α).
In [7] an investigation of negative modalities is accomplished on top of the
∧∨⊤⊥-fragment of classical logic, and the same base language had already
been considered in [18] for the combination of positive and negative modalities.
Typically, in studies of positive and negative modalities the so-called compati-
bility (bi-relational) frames are used, and certain appropriate conditions upon
the commutativity of diagrams involving their two relations are imposed, hav-
ing as effect the heredity of truth (i.e., its persistence towards the future) with
respect to one of the mentioned relations (assumed to be a partial order).
There are a number of studies (e.g. [21,6]) in which the above mentioned
languages for dealing with negative modalities are upgraded in order to count
on an (intuitionistic or classical) implication, and sometimes also its dual, co-
implication (cf. [17]). If one may count on classical implication, however, it
suffices to add to it the modal paraconsistent negation given by ‘unnecessity’
(cf. [13]), and all other connectives of normal modal logics turn out to be
definable from such impoverished basis (indeed, where ` is a primitive symbol
for unnecessity and→ represents classical implication, we have that ∼α := α→
`(α → α) behaves as the classical negation of α, and 2α := ∼`α behaves as
the usual positive modality box).
Our intuition about the relation between a paracomplete (a.k.a. ‘intuition-
istic-like’) negation and a paraconsistent negation is that the former would
be expected to be more demanding than the latter, while classical negation
should sit between the two (whenever it also turns out to be expressible). It
takes indeed more effort to assert a negated statement constructively, while such
statements are more readily asserted should some contradictions be allowed to
subsist; in other words, negations in a paracomplete logic come at a greater
cost than classical negations, while paraconsistent logics indulge on negations
in which classical logic would show greater restraint. The presence of a clas-
sical negation, however, often makes it too easy to forget that there are two
distinct kinds of deviations equally worth studying, concerning non-classical
negation, as one of these deviations may then be recovered in the standard way
as the dual of the other. In order to get a better grasp of the duality between
paraconsistent and paracomplete modal negations (namely, unnecessity vs. im-
possibility), we purposefully make an effort to prevent the underlying language
from being sufficiently expressive so as to allow for the definition of a classical
negation (or a classical implication) — whenever that goal lies within reach.
Here we do however in all cases enrich our object language with certain ‘adjust-
ment connectives’ expressing negation-consistency and negation-determinacy,
allowing for the simulation of usual features of classical negation and for the
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(partial) recovery of classical reasoning. It should be noted, however, that as a
byproduct of the presence of such adjustment connectives truth will no longer
be hereditary in our Kripke models, that is, it will not in general be preserved
for all compound formulas towards the future, in contrast with what happens
with models of compatibility frames.
In what follows, first and foremost we will concentrate on the logic PK,
determined by the class of all Kripke frames, which has been introduced and
received a presentation as a sequent system in [5]. We show here that it can be
reintroduced in terms of a so-called ‘basic sequent system’, which allows one
to take advantage of general techniques developed in [10], including a method
for obtaining sound and complete Kripke semantics and a uniform recipe for
semantic proofs of cut-admissibility or analyticity. The next section adopts a
semantical perspective to explain why and how our study is done.
2 On negative modalities
We briefly recall the now familiar elements of a Kripke semantics. A frame is a
structure consisting of a nonempty setW (of ‘worlds’) and a binary (‘accessibil-
ity’) relation R on W . A model M = 〈F , V 〉 is based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉
and on a valuation V : W × L → {f, t} that assigns truth-values to worlds
w ∈ W and sentences ϕ of a propositional language L generated over a denu-
merable set of propositional variables P . The valuations must satisfy certain
conditions that are induced by the fixed interpretation of the connectives of the
language. When V (w,ϕ) = t we say that V satisfies ϕ at w, and denote this by
M, w  ϕ; otherwise we write M, w 6 ϕ and say that V leaves ϕ unsatisfied
at w. The connectives from the positive fragment of classical logic receive their
standard boolean interpretations locally, world-wise, by recursively setting:
[S⊤] M, w  ⊤
[S∧] M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w  ϕ and M, w  ψ
[S∨] M, w 6 ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w 6 ϕ and M, w 6 ψ
Given formulas Γ∪∆ of L, and given a class of frames E , we say that Γ entails
∆ in E , and denote this by Γ |=E ∆, if for each model M based on a frame
F ∈ E and each world w of M we have either M, w 6 γ for some γ ∈ Γ or
M, w  δ for some δ ∈ ∆. The assertion Γ |=E ∆ will be called a consecution.
As usual, in what follows we will focus most of the time on consecutions Γ |=E ∆
involving a singleton ∆, and in the next section we will extend the notion of
entailment so as to cover sequents instead of formulas. The subscript E shall
be omitted in what follows whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
In the following subsections we extend the above language with connectives
whose modal interpretations will be useful for the investigation of non-classical
negations.
2.1 Adding negations
Our first extension of the above language proceeds by the addition of a 1-ary
connective `, to be interpreted non-locally as follows:
4 It ain’t necessarily so: Basic sequent systems for negative modalities
[S`] M, w  `ϕ iff M, v 6 ϕ for some v ∈ W such that wRv
Accordingly, a formula `ϕ is said to be satisfied at a given world of a model
precisely when the formula ϕ fails to be satisfied at some world accessible from
this given world. In the following paragraph we will show that ` respects
some minimal conditions to deserve being called a ‘negation’, namely, we will
demonstrate its ability to invert truth-values assigned to certain formulas (at
certain worlds).
Let # represent an arbitrary 1-ary connective, and let #j abbreviate a j-
long sequence of #’s. The least we will demand from # to call it a negation is
that, for every p ∈ P and every k ∈ N:
JfalsificatioK #kp 6|= #k+1p JverificatioK #k+1p 6|= #kp
To witness JfalsificatioK, some sentence ϕ is to be satisfied while the sentence
#ϕ is not simultaneously satisfied; for JverificatioK some sentence ϕ is left
unsatisfied while at the same time #ϕ is satisfied. To check that the connec-
tive ` fulfills such requisites, it suffices for instance to build a frame in which
W = {wn : n ∈ N} and wRv iff v = w
++ (namely, v is the successor of w), and
consider a valuation V such that V (wn, p) = t iff n is odd.
It is very easy to see that our connective ` satisfies global contraposition
in the sense that α |= β implies `β |= `α. Indeed, assume α |= β and suppose
thatM, w  `β for some world w of an arbitrarymodelM. Then, [S`] informs
us that there must be some world v inM such that wRv andM, v 6 β. By the
definition of entailment, the initial assumption gives usM, v 6 α. Using again
[S`] we conclude that M, w  `α. As a byproduct of this, if one defines an
equivalence relation ≡ on L by setting α ≡ β whenever both α |= β and β |= α,
then an easy structural induction on L establishes that ≡ is not only compatible
with ` but also with the other connectives that are used in constructing the
algebra of formulas; in other words, ≡ constitutes a congruence relation on L.
It is straightforward to see that any 1-ary connective # satisfying global
contraposition is such that, given p, q ∈ P :
(DM1.1#) #(p ∨ q) |= #p ∧#q (DM2.1#) #p ∨#q |= #(p ∧ q)
If # also respects the following consecutions, then it is said to be a full type
diamond-minus connective:
(DM2.2#) #(p ∧ q) |= #p ∨#q (DT#) #⊤ |= p
Note that ` is a full type diamond-minus connective. To check that ` satisfies
(DM2.2#), indeed, suppose that M, w  `(p ∧ q) for some arbitrary world w
of an arbitrary model M. By [S`] we know that there is some world v such
that wRv and M, v 6 p ∧ q. It follows by [S∧] that M, v 6 p or M, v 6 q.
Using [S`] again we conclude that M, w  `p or M, w  `q and [S∨] gives
us M, w  `p ∨ `q. In addition, to check that ` satisfies (DT#) one may
invoke [S`] and [S⊤]. Note that satisfying (DT#) means that the nullary
connective ⊥ taken as an abbreviation of #⊤ is interpretable by setting, for
every world w of every model M:
[S⊥] M, w 6 ⊥
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Given a negation #, we call the logic containing it #-paraconsistent if the
following consecution fails, for p, q ∈ P :
J#-explosionK p,#p |= q
This means that there must be valuations that satisfy both some sentence ϕ and
the sentence #ϕ while not satisfying every other sentence. It is worth noticing
that J`-explosionK holds good in frames containing exclusively worlds that are
accessible to themselves, and themselves only (call such worlds ‘narcissistic’)
and worlds that do not access any other world (call them ‘dead ends’): in
the former case, it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy both ϕ and `ϕ; in
the latter case, the sentence `ϕ is never satisfied. Note moreover that in the
class of all narcissistic frames the connective ` happens to behave like classical
negation, i.e., it behaves like the symbol ∼ in the following semantic clause:
[S∼] M, w  ∼ϕ iff M, w 6 ϕ
In contrast, in the class of all frames whose worlds are all dead ends the connec-
tive ` does not respect [verificatio], and cannot be said thus to be a negation.
We now make a further extension of the above language by adding a 1-ary
connective a, non-locally interpreted as follows:
[Sa] M, w  aϕ iff M, v 6 ϕ for every v ∈W such that wRv
It is not difficult to check that again we have a connective that qualifies as
a negation, and satisfies global contraposition. To reinforce the meta-theore-
tical duality between the latter negation and the negation introduced above
through [S`], we will henceforth refer to the previous interpretation clause in
the following equivalent form:
[Sa] M, w 6 aϕ iff M, v  ϕ for some v ∈ W such that wRv
A full type box-minus connective is a 1-ary connective # that respects:
(DM1.2#) #p ∧#q |= #(p ∨ q) (DF#) p |= #⊥
One may easily check that a is indeed a full type box-minus connective.
Given a negation #, we call the logic contaning it #-paracomplete if it fails
the following consecution, for p, q ∈ P :
J#-implosionK q |= #p, p
Such failure will clearly be the case for # = a as soon as we entertain frames
that contain worlds that are neither dead ends nor narcissistic. Otherwise, we
see that a will behave either like classical negation (if all worlds are narcissistic)
or like ⊤ (if all worlds are dead ends).
In the following sections, unless noted otherwise, we will no longer consider
classes of frames containing only frames with worlds that are either dead ends
or narcissistic — so we will only consider entailment relations that are `-
paraconsistent and a-paracomplete, for the negative modalities ` (assumed to
be full-type diamond-minus) and a (assumed to be full-type box-minus).
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2.2 Recovering negation-consistency and negation-determinacy
In what follows we will call a model dadaistic when it contains some world in
which all formulas are satisfied, and call it nihilistic if it leaves all formulas
unsatisfied at some world. It is straightforward to see that the language based
on ∧∨⊤`, with the above interpretations, admits dadaistic models, while the
language based on ∧∨⊥a admits nihilistic models.
Recall that a #-paraconsistent logic allows for valuations that satisfy certain
formulas ϕ and #ϕ while leaving some other formula ψ unsatisfied (at some
fixed world). There might be reasons for disallowing this phenomenon to occur
with an arbitrary ϕ, or for restricting to certain formulas ψ but not others. A
particularly useful way of keeping a finer control over which ‘inconsistencies’
of the form ϕ and #ϕ are to be acceptable within non-dadaistic models is to
mark down the formula thereby involved so as to recover a ‘gentle’ version of
J#-explosionK. Concretely, for us here, a 1-ary connective #© that strongly
internalizes the meta-theoretic ‘consistency assumption’ at the object language
level will be such that:
[SC#] M, w  #©ϕ iff M, w 6 ϕ or M, w 6 #ϕ
It is easy to check that any connective #© respecting [SC#] is such that:
(C1#) #©p, p,#p |= (C2#) |= p, #©p (C3#) |= #p, #©p
Note in particular that (C1#) guarantees that there are no valuations that
satisfy (at a fixed world) both p and #p if these are put in the presence of
#©p. Thus, in case # fails J#-explosionK we may look at the latter formula
involving #© as guaranteeing that a weaker form of explosion is available. On
these grounds we shall call the connective #© an adjustment companion to #: it
allows one to recover explosion from within a non-#-explosive (i.e., paraconsis-
tent) logical context, and adjust the consecutions of the underlying logic so as
to allow for the simulation of the consecutions that would otherwise be justified
by reference to J#-explosionK. Semantically, the presence of such connective
also guarantees that dadaistic models are not admissible over the language
based on ∧∨⊤`#`, with the above interpretations. This is because a formula
of the form #`ϕ ∧ (ϕ ∧`ϕ) is equivalent to a formula ⊥ respecting [S⊥].
Dually, a #-paracomplete logic allows for valuations that leave the formu-
las ϕ and #ϕ both unsatisfied (at some fixed world), while satisfying some
other formula ψ. A particular way of keeping a finer control over which ‘inde-
terminacies’ of the form ϕ and #ϕ are to be acceptable within non-nihilistic
models is to allow for a ‘gentle’ version of J#-implosionK, where a 1-ary connec-
tive #© internalizes the meta-theoretic ‘determinacy assumption’ at the object
language level, in such a way that:
[SD#] M, w 6 #©ϕ iff M, w  ϕ or M, w  #ϕ
Clearly, any connective #© respecting [SD#] is such that:
(D1#) |= #p, p, #©p (D2#) #©p, p |= (D3#) #©p,#p |=
Note that a formula of the form (ϕ∨aϕ)∨ #`ϕ is equivalent to a formula ⊤
respecting [S⊤]. Note, moreover, that whenever it turns out that a connective #
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respects J#-explosionK and at the same time its adjustment companion #© re-
spects [SC#], then the formula #©ϕ is equivalent to ⊤. In an analogous way,
whenever a connective # respects J#-implosionK and at the same time its
adjustment companion #© respects [SD#], the formula #©ϕ is equivalent to ⊥.
This stresses the fact that the adjustment connectives with which we deal in
this subsection are more interesting when they accompany the respective non-
classical negations to whose meaning they contribute.
At this point we have finally finished constructing the richest language that
will be used throughout the rest of the paper: It will contain the connec-
tives ∧∨⊤⊥`#`a#a, disciplined by the [S#] conditions above. In the following
subsection we will explain precisely when a classical negation, that is a 1-ary
connective ∼ subject to condition [S∼], is definable with the use of our lan-
guage. Fixed such language, the logic characterized over it by the class E of all
frames will be called PK; the logic characterized by the class ED of all frames
with serial accessibility relations will be called PKD; the logic characterized
by the class ET of all frames with reflexive accessibility relations will be called
PKT ; the logic characterized by the class EFun of all frames whose accessibility
relations are total functions will be called PKF ; the logic characterized by the
class EB of all symmetric frames (those with symmetric accessibility relations)
will be called PKB.
2.3 Around classical negation
According to the intuitions laid down at Section 1, one could expect that in
general (a) aα ⊢ ∼α and (b) ∼α ⊢ `α. It is easy to see that these consecutions
are sanctioned by PKT , for the classical negation ∼ that may be defined by
setting ∼ϕ := `ϕ ∧ #`ϕ (alternatively, one may set ∼ϕ := aϕ ∨#aϕ).
Meanwhile, in the deductively weaker logic PKD one cannot in general
prove (a) nor (b), even though a classical negation may be defined in this logic
by setting ∼ϕ := (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨ #aϕ. However, one can still easily prove in
PKD that (c) aα ⊢ `α. In the logic PKF , deductively stronger than PKD
(but neither stronger nor weaker than PKT ) one may also prove the converse
consecution, (d) `α ⊢ aα. Indeed, suppose M, w  `α. There is, by the fact
that the accessibility relation is a total function, a single world v such that
wRv. Then M, v 6 α, by [S`]. For a similar reason, invoking now [Sa] we
conclude thatM, w  aα. Note that (c) and (d) together make our two modal
non-classical negations indistinguishable from the viewpoint of PKF , yet there
would still be no reason for them to collapse into classical negation.
The situation concerning classical negation and its relation to its non-clas-
sical neighbours gets even more interesting if one acknowledges that no classical
negation is definable in PK, the weakest of our logics, but also no classical ne-
gation is definable in the fragment of PKT without neither of the adjustment
connectives, or in the fragment of PKF (or PKD) without either one of the
adjustment connectives, or in PKB. Detailed proofs concerning the mentioned
results about (non)definability of classical negation in the weak modal logics
that constitute our present object of study may be found in Section 6.
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Notice that in PKD and its extensions there are no negated formulas that
happen to be true or false at a given world just because there are no worlds
accessible from it. Note also that the logic PKT is: paraconsistent but not
paracomplete with respect to the connective `; paracomplete but not paracon-
sistent with respect to a (even though we will not prove it here, this logic is
indeed the least extension of the positive implicationless fragment of classical
logic with the latter mentioned properties). The logic PKT will have its word
in the following sections, for it also allows for the straightforward application
of the techniques that will be hereby illustrated. In the other four mentioned
logics, in contrast, both non-classical negations behave at once as paracom-
plete and paraconsistent negations (recall, though, that each is associated to
a different adjustment connective). We take the cases among these in which
no classical negation is available to be particularly attractive for the task of
revealing the ‘uncontamined’ nature of non-classical negation. Establishing
well-behaved proof theoretical counterparts for such logics, as we shall do in
what follows, is meant to allow for them to be better understood and dealt
with.
3 A proof system for PK
A sequent calculus for PK, that we denote by PK, was introduced in [5], and

















Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆
[⇒∧]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
[∨⇒]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
[⇒∨]
Γ⇒ ϕ,ψ,∆

















Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ,aϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ #aϕ,∆
Above, sequents are taken to have the form Σ ⇒ Π where Σ and Π are finite
sets of formulas, and given a unary connective # and Ψ ⊆ L, by #Ψ we denote
the set {#ψ | ψ ∈ Ψ}. We write S ⊢PK s to say that there is a derivation in
PK of a sequent s from a set S of sequents. That establishes a consequence
relation between sequents. A consequence relation between formulas is defined
by setting Γ ⊢PK ϕ if ⊢PK Γ
′ ⇒ ϕ for some finite subset Γ′ of Γ. The overloaded
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notation ⊢PK will always be resolved by the pertinent context.
Next, we utilize in what follows the general mechanisms and methods ap-
plicable to the so-called ‘basic systems’ of [10] in order to prove soundness,
completeness and cut-admissibility. From the viewpoint of basic systems, each
sequent is seen as a union of a ‘main sequent’ and a ‘context sequent’. For
example, in [⇒∨], the main sequent of the premise is ⇒ ϕ, ψ; the main se-
quent of the conclusion is ⇒ ϕ∨ψ; and the context sequent of both is Γ⇒ ∆.
Note that in the rules for ` and a, the context sequent of the premise is
different from the one of the conclusion. Accordingly, [10] introduces the no-
tion of a basic rule, whose premises take the form 〈s, pi〉, where s is a sequent
that corresponds to the main sequent of the premise, and pi is a relation be-
tween singleton-sequents (that is, sequents of the form ϕ ⇒ or ⇒ ϕ) called
a context relation that determines the behavior of the context sequents. The
sequent calculus PK may be naturally regarded as a basic system that em-
ploys two context relations, namely: pi0 = {〈p1 ⇒ ; p1 ⇒〉 , 〈⇒ p1 ; ⇒ p1〉},
and pi1 = {〈p1 ⇒ ; ⇒ `p1〉 , 〈⇒ p1 ; ap1 ⇒〉}. The rules of PK may then be
presented as particular instances of basic rules. For example, the following are
the basic rules for ∧,`,a and #`:
[⇒∧] 〈⇒ p1;pi0〉 , 〈⇒ p2;pi0〉 / ⇒ p1 ∧ p2 [∧⇒] 〈p1, p2 ⇒;pi0〉 / p1 ∧ p2 ⇒
[`⇒] 〈⇒ p1;pi1〉 /`p1 ⇒ [⇒a] 〈p1 ⇒;pi1〉 / ⇒ ap1
[#`⇒] 〈⇒ p1;pi0〉 , 〈⇒ `p1;pi0〉 / #`p1 ⇒ [⇒#`] 〈p1,`p1 ⇒;pi0〉 / ⇒ #`p1
In applications of [⇒#`], the context sequent is left unchanged, as two singleton-
sequents relate to each other (with respect to pi0) iff they are the same. In
contrast, applications of [`⇒] are based on pi1. A sequent Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 relates
(with respect to pi1) to a sequent Γ2 ⇒ ∆2 iff Γ2 = a∆1 and ∆2 = `Γ1.
We extend the notion of satisfaction from Section 2 to sequents by setting
M, w  Γ ⇒ ∆ if M, w 6 γ for some γ ∈ Γ or M, w  δ for some δ ∈ ∆.
Semantics for PK may then be obtained using the general method introduced
in [10], by having each derivation rule and each context relation match a se-
mantic condition, and the semantics of the system is obtained by conjoining all
these semantic conditions. For example, the basic rule [`⇒] induces the con-
dition: “ifM, v ⇒ ϕ for every world v such that wRv, thenM, w  `ϕ⇒”,
which is equivalent to: “If M, w  `ϕ then M, v 6 ϕ for some v ∈ W such
that wRv”. This is half of clause [S`], from Section 2. Furthermore, the
context relation pi1 induces an additional semantic condition: “if wRv then
M, w  ⇒ `ϕ whenever M, v  ϕ ⇒”. This amounts to the other half of
clause [S`], namely: “M, w  `ϕ whenever M, v 6 ϕ for some v ∈ W such
that wRv”. Systematically applying this semantic reading to all rules and all
context relations of PK (according to Definitions 4.5 and 4.12 of [10]), one ob-
tains soundness and completeness with respect to the class of all Kripke models
〈F , V 〉, where F is an arbitrary frame and each valuation V : W × L → {f, t}
respects the following conditions, for every w ∈W and ϕ, ψ ∈ L:
[T⊤] Tw(⊤)
[F⊥] Fw(⊥)
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[T∧] if Tw(ϕ) and Tw(ψ), then Tw(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[F∧] if Fw(ϕ) or Fw(ψ), then Fw(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[T∨] if Tw(ϕ) or Tw(ψ), then Tw(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[F∨] if Fw(ϕ) and Fw(ψ), then Fw(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[T`] if Fv(ϕ) for some v ∈W such that wRv, then Tw(`ϕ)
[F`] if Tv(ϕ) for every v ∈ W such that wRv, then Fw(`ϕ)
[Ta] if Fv(ϕ) for every v ∈W such that wRv, then Tw(aϕ)
[Fa] if Tv(ϕ) for some v ∈ W such that wRv, then Fw(aϕ)
[T#`] if Fw(ϕ) or Fw(`ϕ), then Tw(#`ϕ)
[F#`] if Tw(ϕ) and Tw(`ϕ), then Fw(#`ϕ)
[T#a] if Fw(ϕ) and Fw(aϕ), then Tw(#aϕ)
[F#a] if Tw(ϕ) or Tw(aϕ), then Fw(#aϕ)
where we take ‘Tu(α)’ as abbreviating ‘V (u, α) = t’, and ‘Fu(α)’ as abbreviat-
ing ‘V (u, α) = f ’. If alternatively one just rewrites V (v, α) = t as M, v  α
and rewrites V (v, α) = f as M, v 6 α, where M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉, what results
thereby is a collection of conditions that are essentially identical to the [S#]
clauses introduced in our Section 2.
Two brief comments are in order here. First, our valuation functions assign
truth-values to every formula in every world. However, as the values of com-
pound formulas are uniquely determined by the values of their subformulas, we
could have rested content above with assigning truth-values to propositional
variables. Second, given that for the above valuations Tu(α) is the case iff
Fu(α) fails to be the case, the semantic conditions [T#] and [F#], for each
connective #, are clearly the converse of each other. In setting the two condi-
tions apart, we have just given them directionality, pointing from less complex
to more complex formulas, and have separated between conditions induced by
rules from those induced by context relations. While neither of these manoeu-
vres are very useful here, they will allow us to more easily relate, in Section 4,
valuations to ‘quasi valuations’ that have non truth-functional semantics.
Fix in what follows a Kripke model M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉. We say that w, v ∈
W agree with respect to the formula α, according to V , if either (Tw(α) and
Tv(α)) or (Fw(α) and Fv(α)). We say thatM is differentiated if we have w = v
whenever w and v agree with respect to every α ∈ L, according to V . We call
M a strengthened model if wRv iff (Tv(α) implies Fw(aα)) and (Fv(α) implies
Tw(`α)), for every α ∈ L. It is worth stressing that the accessibility relation
of a strengthened model is uniquely determined by the underlying collection of
worlds and valuation. The following result follows directly from Corollary 4.26
in [10], thus there is no need to prove it again here:
Theorem 3.1 PK is sound and complete with respect to any class of Kripke
models that: (i) contains only models that satisfy all the above [T#] and [F#]
conditions; and (ii) contains all strengthened differentiated models that satisfy
all the above [T#] and [F#] conditions.
This theorem provides a mechanism that will be recycled in the subsequent
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sections, when we consider extensions of PK. The following result from [5]
comes as a byproduct of it:
Corollary 3.2 Γ |=E ϕ iff Γ ⊢PK ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where E denotes
the class of all frames.
4 (Almost) Free Lunch: cut-elimination and analyticity
In this section we make further use of the powerful machinery introduced in [10]
to prove that PK enjoys strong cut-admissibility, in other words, we show that
S ⊢PK s implies that there is a derivation in PK of the sequent s from the set
of sequents S such that in every application of the cut rule the cut formula ϕ
appears in S. In particular, ⊢PK s implies that s is derivable in PK without
any use of the cut rule. The proof is done in two steps. First, we present an
adequate semantics for the cut-free fragment of PK. Second, we show that a
countermodel in this new semantics entails the existence of a countermodel in
the form of a Kripke model as defined in the previous section. This, together
with Corollary 3.2, entails that PK is equivalent to its cut-free fragment.
Step 1. Semantics for cut-free PK
Semantics for cut-free basic systems may be obtained through the use of ‘quasi
valuations’. Models based on quasi valuations differ from usual Kripke models
in two main aspects: (a) the underlying interpretation is three-valued; (b) the
underlying interpretation is non-deterministic — the truth-value of a compound
formula in a given world is not always uniquely determined by the truth values
of its subformulas in the collection of worlds of the underlying frame.
To obtain such semantics for PK, as before, one reads off a semantic condi-
tion on quasi valuations from each derivation rule and from each context rela-
tion. As per Theorems 5.24 and 5.31 of [10], we know that the class of models
based on quasi valuations that respect all these conditions is sound and com-
plete for the cut-free fragment of PK. Concretely, given a frame F = 〈W,R〉,
a quasi valuation over it is a function QV : W × L → {{f} , {t} , {f, t}} sat-
isfying precisely the same semantic conditions laid down in Section 3, where
we now take ‘Tu(α)’ as abbreviating ‘t ∈ V (u, α)’, and ‘Fu(α)’ as abbreviating
‘f ∈ V (u, α)’. Whenever we need to distinguish between a semantic condition
on a tuple 〈w,ϕ〉 as constraining a valuation V or a quasi valuation QV , we
will use Xw(ϕ) for the former and X
Q
w(ϕ) for the latter, where X ∈ {T,F}.
A quasi model is a structure QM = 〈F , QV 〉, where QV is a quasi valuation
over F . The notions of a differentiated quasi model and of a strengthened quasi
model are defined as before, assuming the same abbreviations.
Step 2. Semantic cut-admissibility
The next step is to show that the existence of a countermodel in the form of a
strengthened differentiated quasi model implies the existence a countermodel
in the form of an ordinary Kripke model (following Corollary 5.48 of [10]). For
this purpose we define an instance of a quasi model QM = 〈〈W,R〉 , QV 〉 as
any model of the form M = 〈〈W,R′〉 , V 〉 such that XQw(ϕ) whenever Xw(ϕ),
12 It ain’t necessarily so: Basic sequent systems for negative modalities
for every X ∈ {T,F}, every w ∈ W and every ϕ ∈ L. Note that a quasi model
and its instances may have different accessibility relations.
In what follows, the construction of appropriate instances is done by a
recursive definition over the following well-founded relation ≺ on the set of
formulas: α ≺ β if either (i) α is a proper subformula of β; (ii) α = `γ and
β = #`γ for some γ ∈ L; or (iii) α = aγ and β = #aγ for some γ ∈ L.
Lemma 4.1 Every quasi model has an instance.
Proof. Let QM = 〈F , QV 〉 be a quasi model based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉.
We set us now an appropriate valuation V :W ×L → {f, t}. For every world w
and formula ϕ, the valuation V is inductively defined (with respect to ≺) on ϕ
as follows: (R1) if TQw(ϕ) fails for QV , we postulate Fw(ϕ) to be the case
for V ; (R2) if FQw(ϕ) fails for QV , we postulate Tw(ϕ) to be the case for V ;
(R3) otherwise both TQw(ϕ) and F
Q
w(ϕ) hold good for QV , and in this case we
postulate Tw(ϕ) to be the case for V if one of the following holds:
(M1) ϕ is a propositional variable or ϕ is ⊤
(M2) ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, and both Tw(ϕ1) and Tw(ϕ2)
(M3) ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, and either Tw(ϕ1) or Tw(ϕ2)
(M4) ϕ = `ψ, and Fv(ψ) for some v ∈ W such that wRv
(M5) ϕ = aψ, and Fv(ψ) for every v ∈W such that wRv
(M6) ϕ = #`ψ, and either Fw(ψ) or Fw(`ψ)
(M7) ϕ = #aψ, and both Fw(ψ) and Fw(aψ)
Otherwise, we postulate Fw(ϕ) to be the case for V . Obviously, Xw(ϕ) implies
XQw(ϕ) for every w ∈ W , every ϕ ∈ L and every X ∈ {T,F}. It is routine to
verify that 〈F , V 〉 is a model. We show here that the semantic conditions for
` and #` hold:
[Case of `] Let ψ ∈ L. Suppose first that Fv(ψ) is the case for some v ∈ W
such that wRv. Then FQv (ψ). Since QM is a quasi model, then T
Q
w(`ψ) is
the case. If, on the one hand, FQw(`ψ) fails, then we must have Tw(`ψ), by
(R2). If, on the other hand, neither TQw(`ψ) nor F
Q
w(`ψ) fail, we are in case
(R3). Since we have Fv(ψ) and wRv we conclude by (M4) that Tw(`ψ) must
be the case. Suppose now that Tv(ψ) is the case for every world v such that
wRv. Then we have TQv (ψ) for every such world. Since QM is a quasi model,
it follows that FQw(`ψ) is the case. If, on the one hand, T
Q
w(`ψ) fails, then
we must have Fw(`ψ), by (R1). If, on the other hand, neither T
Q
w(`ψ) nor
FQw(`ψ) fail, we are in case (R3). Since we have Tv(ψ) for every world v such
that wRv we conclude that none of (M1)–(M7) applies, thus Fw(`ψ) must be
the case.
[Case of #`] Let ψ ∈ L. Suppose first that either Fw(ψ) or Fw(`ψ) are the case
for some w ∈W . Then either FQw(ψ) or F
Q
w(`ψ). Since QM is a quasi model,
it follows that TQw(#`ψ). If, on the one hand, F
Q
w(#`ψ) fails, then we must have





we are in case (R3) and we conclude by (M6) that Tw(#`ψ) must be the case.
Suppose now that both Tw(ψ) and Tw(`ψ) are the case for some w ∈ W . Then
TQw(ψ) and T
Q
w(`ψ). Since QM is a quasi model, then F
Q
w(#`ψ). If, on the
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one hand, TQw(#`ψ) fails, then we must have Fw(#`ψ), by (R1). If, on the other
hand, neither TQw(#`ψ) nor F
Q
w(#`ψ) fail, we are in case (R3) and Fw(#`ψ) must
be the case because none of (M1)–(M7) applies. 2
Since the class of all quasi models contains the strengthened differentiated
quasi models, it follows that:
Corollary 4.2 PK enjoys strong cut-admissibility.
Corollary 4.3 PK is ≺-analytic: If a sequent s is derivable from a set S of
sequents in PK, then there is a derivation of s from S such that every formula
ϕ that occurs in the derivation satisfies ϕ ≺ ψ for some ψ in S ∪ s.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of s from S in PK: In all
rules except for (cut), the premises include only formulas ϕ that satisfy ϕ ≺ ψ
for some formula ψ in the conclusion. 2
5 Some special classes of frames
In this section we present three very natural deductive extensions of PK. Given
a property X of binary relations, we call a frame 〈W,R〉 an X frame if R en-
joysX . A (quasi) model 〈F , V 〉 is called an X (quasi) model if F is an X frame.
In addition, and similarly to what we did in the case of PK, for every proof
system Y we write S ⊢Y s if there is a derivation of s from S in Y .
5.1 Seriality




This rule may be formulated as the basic rule: 〈⇒ ; pi1〉 / ⇒. Since its premise
is the empty sequent, the semantic condition it imposes (following [10]) is serial-
ity: indeed, respecting [D] in a world w of a modelM based on a frame 〈W,R〉
means that ifM, v ⇒ for every world v such that wRv, then alsoM, w ⇒.
Since the empty sequent is not satisfied at any world, this condition would hold
iff for every world w there exists a world v such that wRv. A similar argument
shows that every serial frame satisfies this semantic condition.
As in Corollary 3.2, we obtain a completeness theorem for PKD with respect
to serial models:
Corollary 5.1 Γ |=ED ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKD ϕ for every Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where ED is the
class of serial models.
Additionally, we may prove cut-admissibility also for PKD, going through
serial quasi models.
Lemma 5.2 Every serial quasi model has a serial instance.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 4.1. Note indeed that no
property of the accessibility relation was assumed, and the constructed instance
has the same accessibility relation as the original quasi model. 2
Corollary 5.3 PKD enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺-analytic.
14 It ain’t necessarily so: Basic sequent systems for negative modalities
5.2 Reflexivity







These rules may be formulated as the basic rules: 〈p1 ⇒ ; pi0〉 / ⇒ `p1 and
〈⇒ p1 ; pi0〉 /ap1 ⇒ . It should be clear that PKT allows thus for the deriva-
tion of the consecutions representing J`-implosionK and Ja-explosionK.
Semantically, they impose reflexivity not on all models, but only on strength-
ened models. Indeed, since the underlying context relation is pi0, for every
modelM = 〈F , V 〉 based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉 that respects [⇒`] and [a⇒],
and every world w, if M, w  ϕ ⇒ then M, w  ⇒ `ϕ and if M, w  ⇒ ϕ
then M, w  aϕ⇒. To put it otherwise, if Fw(ϕ) then Tw(`ϕ), and if Tw(ϕ)
then Fw(aϕ). Clearly, every reflexive model satisfies these conditions. To show
that every strengthened model that satisfies them is reflexive, consider an ar-
bitrary strengthened model M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉. Then for every world w ∈ W
we have that for every formula ϕ, (Tw(ϕ) implies Fw(aϕ)) and (Fw(ϕ) implies
Tw(`ϕ)), which in strengthened models means precisely that wRw. We obtain
thus a completeness theorem for PKT with respect to reflexive models:
Corollary 5.4 Γ |=ET ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKT ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where ET is the
class of reflexive models.
Such semantics for PKT allows one to easily confirm that the full type
diamond-minus connective ` fails (DM1.2#), and that the full type box-minus
connective a fails (DM2.2#). These properties transfer to the weaker logics
PKD and PK, of course.
Cut-admissibility for PKT may be obtained using arguments similar to
those used in proving Lemma 4.1. It follows thus that:
Lemma 5.5 Every reflexive strengthened quasi model has a reflexive instance.
Corollary 5.6 PKT enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺-analytic.
5.3 Functionality
In this section we address functional frames, that is, frames whose accessibility
relations are total functions. In every model 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉 of a functional frame
and world w ∈ W , we have Tw(`ϕ) iff Tw(aϕ). Hence ` and a are indistin-
guishable. Accordingly, here we consider a restricted language, without a.
Let PKF be the system obtained from PK by substituting ` for a in rules




It is straightforward to see that rule [Fun] may be formulated as the following
basic rule: 〈⇒ ; pi2〉 / ⇒, for pi2 = {〈ϕ⇒ ; ⇒ `ϕ〉 , 〈⇒ ϕ ; `ϕ⇒〉}.
The latter rule and context relation impose functionality on differentiated
models. Indeed, respecting the basic rule [Fun] corresponds to seriality, sim-
ilarly to the case of the rule [D]. Additionally, the context relation pi2 forces
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the accessibility relation to be a partial function: respecting pi2 in a world w
of a model M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉 means that for every v1, v2 ∈ W such that wRv1
and wRv2 and for every formula ϕ we have that Tv1(ϕ) iff Fw(`ϕ) iff Tv2(ϕ).
When M is differentiated, this implies that v1 = v2. Now, every functional
model satisfies these semantic conditions and every differentiated model that
satisfies them is functional. We thus obtain a completeness result for PKF with
respect to functional models:
Corollary 5.7 Γ |=EFun ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKF ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where EFun is
the class of functional models.
In contrast with what was the case for PKT, within such semantics for PKF
there are no longer countermodels for (DM1.2`) or for (DM2.2a). At any rate,
it should be clear that PKF extends PKD, but does not extend PKT.
Going through quasi models we may prove cut-admissibility also for PKF.
However, unlike in previous cases, considering functional quasi models will not
suffice. Indeed, there exist differentiated strengthened quasi models that re-
spect [Fun] whose accessibility relation is not a total function. Let a Fun quasi
model QM = 〈F , QV 〉 based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉 be a serial quasi model in
which for every w, v ∈W such that wRv we have, for every ϕ ∈ L, both (FQv (ϕ)
implies TQw(`ϕ)) and (T
Q
v (ϕ) implies F
Q
w(`ϕ)). We note that, although the
accessibility relation in Fun quasi models may not be a total function, we are
still able to extract a functional model from it:
Lemma 5.8 Every Fun quasi model has a functional instance.
Proof. Let QM = 〈F , QV 〉 be an Fun quasi model based on a frame 〈W,R〉.
Since QM is an Fun quasi model, we have in particular that R is serial.
Therefore, there exists some total function R′ :W →W such that R′ ⊆ R. Let
F ′ = 〈W,R′〉. We define an appropriate valuation V : W × L → {f, t} as in
Lemma 4.1, while disregarding (M5), and using the following instead of (M4)
and (M7):
(M4’) ϕ = `ψ, and FR′(w)(ψ)
(M7’) ϕ = #aψ, and Fw(ϕ) and Fw(`ϕ)
The proof then carries on in a similar fashion to the proof of Lemma 4.1. 2
Corollary 5.9 PKF enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺′-analytic, where ≺′ is
the restriction of ≺ to the a-free fragment of L, with an additional clause
according to which `ϕ ≺ #`ϕ.
We include a word about further developments which could not be included
here for reasons of space. It is easy to see that ` andamay be defined using the
customary presentation of the modal logic K by `ϕ := ∼2ϕ and aϕ := 2∼ϕ.
When considering only functional frames (like in PKF), we get a translation to
KF — the ordinary modal logic of functional Kripke models. For the #`#a-free
fragment of this logic, we may apply the general reduction to SAT proposed in
[11], which in particular means that the derivability problem for it is in co-NP.
We further note that if one dismisses [∨⇒] from the proof system, derivability
16 It ain’t necessarily so: Basic sequent systems for negative modalities
can be decided in linear time, by producing SAT-instances that consist solely
of Horn clauses. Such ‘half-disjunction’ was also suggested in the context of
primal infon logic [2], to obtain a linear time decision procedure.
5.4 Symmetry








These correspond to the following basic rules: 〈p1 ⇒ ; pi3〉 / ⇒ ap1 and
〈⇒ p1 ; pi3〉 /`p1 ⇒, for the context relation pi3 = {〈p1 ⇒ ; ⇒ `p1〉,
〈`p1 ⇒ ; ⇒ p1〉, 〈⇒ p1 ; ap1 ⇒〉, 〈⇒ ap1 ; p1 ⇒〉}. This relation satisfies the
following property: s pi3 q iff q pi3 s, where (⇒ ϕ) denotes (ϕ ⇒) and (ϕ⇒)
denotes (⇒ ϕ). By Proposition 4.28 of [10], the semantic condition these rules
impose on strengthened models is symmetry of the accessibility relation. In
addition, every symmetric model respects these rules, as well as the context
relation pi3. It follows that:
Corollary 5.10 Γ |=EB ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKB ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where EB is
the class of symmetric models.
Symmetric frames are relevant from the viewpoint of sub-classical properties
of negation. They validate, for instance, the consecutions ``p |= p and p |=
aap. Paraconsistent logics based on symmetric (and reflexive) frames are also
studied in [1], a paper that investigates in detail a conservative extension of
the corresponding logic, obtained by the addition of a classical implication (but
without primitive a and #a), and offers for this logic a sequent system for which
cut is not eliminable.
Quasi models for PKB are not necessarily symmetric, making it harder to
convert them into instances in the form of symmetric models. This is why
cut-admissibility for our system PKB is here left open as a matter for fur-
ther research. However, using a similar technique of basic systems, it can be
straightforwardly shown that PKB is ≺-analytic. This does not require quasi
models at all: one only has to show that every partial model, whose valuation’s
domain is closed under ≺-subformulas, may be extended to a full model (see
Corollary 5.44 in [10]).
6 Definability of classical negation
In this section we investigate definability of classical negation in the modal
logics studied in this paper. Given a set C of connectives and a logic L, we
denote by L-C the C-free fragment of L, that is, the restriction of L to the
language without the connectives in C.
Theorem 6.1
(i) Classical negation is definable in the logics: PKT -{`, #`}, PKT -{a,#a},
PKD, and PKF .
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(ii) Classical negation is not definable in the logics: PK, PKB, PKT -{#`,#a},
PKD-{#`}, PKD-{#a}, PKF -{#`}, and PKF -{#a}.
Proof.
(i) For PKT -{`, #`} we set ∼ϕ := aϕ ∨ #aϕ, for PKT -{a,#a} we set ∼ϕ :=
`ϕ ∧ #`ϕ, and for PKD and PKF we set ∼ϕ := (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨ #aϕ. It is
easy to see that ⇒ ϕ,∼ϕ and ϕ,∼ϕ ⇒ are derivable in each system for the
defined connective∼. Using cut, one obtains the usual sequent rules for classical
negation. Table 1 provides the derivations for PKD. (Given that PKF is a












ϕ, (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨#aϕ⇒
[∨⇒]






⇒ ϕ, (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ),#aϕ
[⇒∧]
⇒ ϕ, (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨#aϕ
[⇒∨]
Table 1
(ii) Let X ∈ {PK, PKB, PKT -{#`,#a}, PKD-{#`}, PKD-{#a}, PKF -{#`},
PKF -{#a}}. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that classical negation ∼
is definable in X . Let p ∈ P and let ϕ be ∼(p). Then both ⇒ ϕ, p and
p, ϕ ⇒ are valid in X . Consider a set W that consists of two worlds, w
and v, and a valuation V such that V (w, q) = 1 and V (v, q) = 0 for every
atomic formula q (including p). Now, for each relation RX on W , consider
the model MX = 〈〈W,RX〉 , V 〉. If MX belongs to the class of models that
semantically characterize X , then we must have that MX , w  ϕ, p ⇒ and
MX , v  ⇒ p, ϕ. Since in MX we have Tw(p) and Fv(p), we must then have
Fw(ϕ) and Tv(ϕ). We show that this is impossible, by structural induction
on ϕ. More precisely, we claim that if Fw(ϕ) then Fv(ϕ). To show this, we
consider the possible values for X , and define the accessibility relation RX in
each case. For X ∈ {PK,PKB} define RX = ∅, for X = PKT -{#`,#a} define
RX = W ×W , for X ∈ {PKD-{#`}, PKF -{#`}} define RX = {〈w, v〉 , 〈v, v〉},
and for X ∈ {PKD-{#a}, PKF -{#a}} define RX = {〈w,w〉 , 〈v, w〉}. We de-
scribe in detail only the third case. For this case, note that since RX is a total
function, MX belongs to the appropriate class of models, and ` and a are
indistinguishable, hence we may choose to consider a instead of `. The cases
where ϕ is atomic, a conjunction, or a disjunction are trivial. If ϕ = aψ for
some ψ and Fw(ϕ), then we must have Tv(ψ) by [Ta], which implies by [Fa]
that Fv(ϕ). If ϕ = #aψ for some ψ, then Fv(ϕ) must hold good: indeed, if on
18 It ain’t necessarily so: Basic sequent systems for negative modalities
the one hand Tw(aψ) then Fv(ψ) by [Fa], and hence Tv(aψ) by [Ta], which
implies by [F#a] that Fv(ϕ); if on the other hand Fw(aψ) then Tv(ψ) by [Ta],
and hence again Fv(ϕ) follows by [F#a]. 2
7 This is possibly not the end
In contrast to the usual ‘positive modalities’ of normal modal logics, which
are monotone with respect to the underlying notion of consequence, we have
devoted this paper to antitone connectives known as ‘negative modalities’ —
specifically, to full type box-minus and full-type diamond-minus connectives.
Be they monotone or antitone on each of their arguments, the connectives of
normal modal logics are always congruential: they treat equivalent formulas as
synonymous. The phenomenon seems to be an exception rather than the rule
if many-valued logics with non-classical negations are involved. For instance,
Kleene’s 3-valued logic fails to be congruential, as p∧¬p is equivalent to q∧¬q,
but their respective negations, ¬(p∧¬p) and ¬(q∧¬q), are not equivalent. Also,
the earliest paraconsistent logic in the literature (cf. [8]) fails to be congruen-
tial, in spite of having been defined in terms of a translation into a fragment of
the modal logic S5, and this failure remained unknown for decades (cf. [12]).
The same holds for the other early paraconsistent logics developed later on,
containing extra ‘strong negations’ that live in the vicinity of classical negation
(cf. [15,4]). Of course, there are important ‘non-exceptions’: intuitionistic logic
and other intermediate logics constitute congruential paracomplete logics. For
another example perhaps more to the point, consider the four-valued logic of
FDE, whose semantics may be formulated having as truth-values {t,b,n, f},
where {t,b} are designated, the transitive reflexive closure of the order ≤ such
that f ≤ b,n ≤ t may be used to define ∧ and ∨, respectively, as its meet and
its join, while ¬〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈f ,b,n, t〉. It is not hard to see that this logic
is congruential and by defining the operators #`〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈t,n,b, t〉 and
#a〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈f ,n,b, f〉 it gets conservatively extended into another congru-
ential logic that deductively extends our logic PKF (but does not deductively
extend PKT ), if we interpret ` as ¬. It is worth noting that the latter logic
is equivalent to the expansion of FDE by the addition of a classical negation.
Some terminological conventions and some concepts used in the present
paper were borrowed or adapted from other fonts, sometimes without explicit
reference. For instance, in Section 2, dadaistic and nihilistic models come
from [13], and that paper also introduces the connectives #` and #a of the so-
called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (cf. [3]) and the dual Logics of Formal Un-
determinedness (cf. [13], where the adjustment connectives are called connec-
tives ‘of perfection’). The minimal conditions on negation, called JfalsificatioK
and JverificatioK, come from [14]. What we in the present paper call ‘deter-
minacy’ has in [5] been called ‘determinedness’. The ‘strengthened models’
from Section 3 correspond to models with strongly-legal valuations in the ter-
minology of [10]. In Section 5, Rule [D] may be thought of as a variation on
the following well-known sequent rule for the modal logic KD: Γ⇒ / 2Γ⇒,
and rules for PKT are variations on the usual sequent rule for the modal logic
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KT : Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ / Γ,2ϕ⇒ ∆ (cf. [22]). Also, the rule for PKF is a variation
on the sequent rule from [9] for the ‘Next’ operator in the temporal logic LTL,
namely: Γ⇒ ∆ / 2Γ⇒ 2∆. We have not been able to find in the literature
the obvious rules Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ / 2Γ,♦ϕ⇒ ♦∆ and Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ / 2Γ⇒ 2ϕ,♦∆ for
the modal logic K of which our rules [`⇒] and [⇒a] from Section 3 would
be variations on. In Section 4, the trick behind using three-valued models for
addressing the admissibility of the cut rule goes at least as far back as [20].
The main feature of our approach here has been to rely on theoretical
technology built elsewhere and show how it may be adapted to the present case.
Our hope is that this should prove a beneficial methodology, and that the idea
of obtaining completeness and cut admissibility as particular applications of
more general results will become more common, rather than proceeding always
through ad hoc completeness and cut elimination theorems.
While we have directed our attention, in this paper, to classes of frames
that turned out to be particularly significative from the viewpoint of the re-
lation between negative modalities of different types, we see two very natural
ways of extending such study. The first natural extension would be to look
at other classes of frames that prove to be relevant from the viewpoint of sub-
classical properties of negation. For instance, it is easy to see that the class
of frames with the Church-Rosser property validates ``p |= aap, pinpoint-
ing an interesting consecution involving the interaction between negations of
different types. Some other classes of frames deserving study do not seem to
show the same amount of promise, from the viewpoint of paraconsistency or
paracompleteness. For instance, euclidean frames validate J`-explosionK if in
the set of formulas {`p, p} one replaces p by `r, and validate Ja-implosionK if
in {ap, p} one replaces p by ar; also, transitive frames cause a similar behav-
ior, but now swapping the roles of `r and ar in replacing p. Alternatively, a
second avenue worth exploring would lead us into logics containing more than
one negative modality of the same type (as it has been done for logics with mul-
tiple paracomplete negations in [18]). One could for instance consider not only
the ‘forward-looking’ negative modalities defined by the semantic clauses [S`]
and [Sa], but also ‘backward-looking’ negative modalities `−1 and a−1 defined
by the clauses obtained from the latter ones by replacing wRv by vRw (such
‘converse modalities’ have been studied in the context of temporal logic [16], as
well as in the context of the so-called Heyting-Brouwer logic [17]). The interac-
tion between the various negations would then be witnessed, in such extended
language, by the validity over arbitrary frames of ‘pure’ consecutions such as
`
−1
`p |= p and ``−1p |= p (as well as p |= a−1ap and p |= aa−1p), and
the validity over symmetric frames of ‘mixed’ consecutions such as a−1`p |= p
and a`−1p |= p (as well as p |= `−1ap and p |= `a−1p). In our view, it
seems worth the effort applying the machinery employed in the present paper
to the above mentioned systems, and still others, in order to investigate results
analogous to the ones we have here looked at. 1
1 The authors acknowledge partial support by the Marie Curie project GeTFun (PIRSES-
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